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Abstract  
If two countries experience similar cycles, loss in monetary sovereignty 
following currency union may not be severe. Analysis of cyclical similarity is 
frequently carried out at the overall industry level, then interpreted with reference 
to regional industrial structures. By contrast, this paper explicitly incorporates 
regional industry structure into an examination of Australasian cycles. Since 1991, 
NZ and Australasian cycles have been highly correlated, but there is little 
evidence that the NZ cycle has been "caused" by Australian regional or industry 
cycles. We test whether the NZDAUD exchange rate has insulated NZ from 
Australian shocks, but find it has not played a major buffering role in response to 
Australian industry shocks (including mining shocks). Instead, the strongest 
impacts on the NZDAUD stem from the NZ cycle. An important loss of monetary 
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This paper addresses issues that are central to consideration of potential 
currency union between Australia and New Zealand. The two countries (together 
termed ‘Australasia’) currently have separate freely floating exchange rates. They 
have substantial trade with each other and so there are microeconomic 
(transactions cost) advantages of their forming a currency union (Grimes et al, 
2000).
1  The price signalling mechanism could be enhanced if prices and wages 
were set in a single currency. In addition, a currency union may deliver capital 
market advantages arising from greater trading depth of the common currency.  
 
A common currency would, however, mean some loss in monetary 
sovereignty for the two countries since exchange rate adjustment would be spread 
over a single currency rather than across two currencies. In most circumstances, 
the smaller country (New Zealand) would have more to lose in terms of monetary 
sovereignty since the common currency would most likely react to region-wide 
developments that would be dominated by the much larger country (Australia). If 
the two countries experience similar shocks and have similar economic cycles, the 
loss in monetary sovereignty may not be severe; common exchange rate 
adjustment could then be as suitable for the smaller country as for the larger 
country. If, however, the sources of shocks and the resulting cycles are quite 
different, the loss in monetary sovereignty may have major consequences for the 
small country. Traditional currency union analysis (Mundell, 1961) suggests that 
                                                 
1 Australia is New Zealand's largest trading partner while New Zealand is one of Australia's top 
five trading partners. They have a comprehensive free trade agreement, free labour flows and are 
harmonizing other aspects of economic regulation (Coleman, 1999; Grimes et al, 2000; Lloyd, 
2002; Goddard, 2002). 2 
this is especially the case in the absence of fiscal transfers between countries 
within the currency union, as is the situation in Australasia.
2 
 
Analysis of cyclical similarity across regions is frequently carried out at 
the overall industry level.
3 Regional cyclical differences are then often interpreted, 
outside of the formal analysis, with reference to industrial structure differences 
across regions. The main contribution of this paper is to examine regional cyclical 
issues explicitly incorporating the regional industry structure into the analysis. 
Examination of shock transmission at this level gives considerably greater insights 
into the sources of regional shocks. In turn, this examination assists analysis of the 
costs that are likely to be involved with the loss of an independent currency. 
Grimes (2004) has examined similarities in trend employment across industries 
within Australasia, where Australasia is divided into nine regions: New Zealand 
plus Australia's six states and two territories. On most measures, New Zealand lies 
between the five large states and Tasmania in terms of structural similarities with 
other regions; the two territories are outliers. This trend information helps to 
interpret the cyclical results contained in this paper. 
 
Our methods build on some of those used by Kouparitsas (2001, 2002) 
who analyses regional business cycle characteristics across US regions, albeit at 
the overall industry level. He uses both correlation analysis and structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) techniques. His correlation approach examines: (a) 
contemporaneous correlation of business cycles across regions; and (b) 1-period 
                                                 
2 For a contrary view, see Kempf and Cooper (2004), who argue that a currency union is welfare-
improving no matter what the correlation of shocks even without inter-regional fiscal transfers, 
provided individual country fiscal policy can be used for stabilization purposes. 
3 For Australasian examples, see Dixon and Shepherd (2001), Hall et al (1998), Hargreaves and 
McDermott (1999), Grimes et al (2000), Haug (2001), Bjorksten (2001), Bjorksten et al (2004).  
3 
lead/lag correlations of business cycles across regions. If the lead/lag correlations 
exceed the corresponding contemporaneous correlations, there is prima facie 
evidence of cycle spillovers from one region to another. Kouparitsas interprets the 
transmission of regional cycles with reference to regional industry characteristics, 
but he does not use these characteristics to derive the cycles.
4  
 
Beine and Coulombe (2003), who examine whether individual Canadian 
provinces should share a common currency with the United States, is another 
analysis performed at the overall industry level.
5 Nevertheless, it has some 
features on which we base aspects of our analysis. They choose not to use 
structural VAR methods, noting that while these methods have strengths, they rely 
for their interpretation on identification assumptions that are to some extent 
arbitrary. Instead, the main methodological approach adopted by Beine and 
Coulombe is to examine the size and significance of quarterly GDP gap 
correlations between Canadian provinces and the US. They also use quarterly 
employment data to compare cyclical positions of Canadian provinces and certain 
US states.  
 
Beine and Coulombe note that the correlation approach does not allow 
them to distinguish between different types of disturbances. Further, by virtue of 
their application to Canadian provinces relative to the US, domestic common 
shocks within Canada (stemming, for instance, from movements in the Canadian 
                                                 
4 See also Owyang and Wall (2004) for analysis of US regional responses to monetary policy. 
Their analysis is also performed at the overall industry level, with ex post reference to industrial 
structure differences. 
5 We share Beine and Coulombe's aim of comparing cycles in a country that may join a currency 
union with those in a larger one. We differ in that we treat the small country as one region and the 
large country as a number of regions that already share a currency union; their analysis treats the 
large entity as one region and divides the smaller one into a number of regions. 4 
dollar) will tend to be reflected in "high" domestic correlations relative to 
correlations of the provinces with the US. This could cloud interpretation of the 
results. Their approach relies on being able to differentiate trend from cycle. They 
adopt three different measures for doing so: a Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter 
with λ=1600 (standard for quarterly data), an HP filter with λ=315, and the Baxter 
and King (1999) band-pass filter. Their results are robust to use of all three 
methods.  
 
Our intention is to incorporate information on industrial sectors across 
regions into the formal analysis of cycle transmission. A brief description of our 
data, across regions and across industries, is presented in section 2. Section 3 
examines the transmission of shocks across regions and across industries using 
bivariate correlation and Granger-causality approaches. Section 4 extends the 
analysis to test the impact of regional industry cycles on the New Zealand - 
Australia cross exchange rate (NZDAUD). Section 5 interprets the results in light 




Australia comprises six states and two territories while New Zealand is a 
unitary state. We refer to each of the states, territories and New Zealand as 
"regions" of Australasia, denoted as: 
ACT  Australian Capital Territory 
NSW New  South  Wales 
NT Northern  Territory 
NZ New  Zealand 
QLD Queensland 
SA South  Australia 
TAS Tasmania 
VIC Victoria 
WA Western  Australia 
AUS  Australia (sum of the eight Australian regions) 
ANZ  Australasia (sum of all nine regions; i.e. AUS plus NZ) 
 
Table 1:  Regional Characteristics* 
  ACT NSW NT NZ QLD SA TAS VIC WA
2003 (June Year)    
Nominal GDP per capita (A$)  47738 40127 45871 29490 33782 32294 27100 39058 42269 
Population (million)  0.317 6.628 0.198 3.942 3.747 1.514 0.472 4.926 1.950 
1990-2003 (growth, % p.a.)    
Real GDP  2.57 3.05 2.53 2.85 4.36 1.97 1.46 2.93 3.78 






















*Data sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics & Statistics New Zealand. In the June 2003 year, 1 
Australian$ (A$1) = US$0.59 
+The Industrial Structure Index measures the average absolute % deviation of region i's industry 
shares relative to ANZ; source: Grimes (2004). 
 
Table 1 presents basic data on each region. Consistent with Bjorksten et 
al (2004) and with Beine and Coulombe (2003), we use quarterly employment 6 
data as the basis for calculating the cyclical positions across each region.
6 These 
data are available on a disaggregated basis for each of nine industries (together 
comprising overall employment) in each region. We calculate trend employment 
and employment shares for each industry in each region and derive the cyclical 
position for each industry in each region.  
 
In Table 1, the 'Industrial Structure Index' provides a measure of the 
similarity of the industrial structure in a region relative to ANZ; a figure of 0.00 
indicates perfect alignment of sectoral shares, a figure of 1.00 indicates an average 
absolute deviation of sectoral shares of 1 percentage point, etc. From this measure, 
the two territories are clear structural outliers relative to ANZ.  
The industry decomposition used in this study is: 
AFF   Agriculture,  Forestry,  Fishing 
BFS    Business and Financial Services 
CON   Construction 
EGW   Electricity,  Gas,  Water 
MAN   Manufacturing 
MIN   Mining 
OTS   Other  Services
7 
TSC    Transport, Storage and Communications 
WRT    Wholesale and Retail Trade
8 
TOT    Total (sum of all nine industries) 
 
To separate trend from cyclical employment, we filter each regional 
industry employment series using an HP filter (with λ=1600). The "employment 
gap" or cycle series for each regional industry is calculated as seasonally adjusted 
                                                 
6 Australian and New Zealand employment data are obtained from Australian Bureau of Statistics 
and Statistics New Zealand respectively. The data are described in more detail in Grimes (2004). 
7 I.e. Community/Social/Personal Services; many of which are provided or funded by government. 
8 Including Accommodation, Cafes, Restaurants  
7 
employment as a ratio of trend employment. The mean of the employment gap for 
each series is almost exactly unity.
9 
 
We denote employment gap series as Gi,j where the prefix, G, represents 
the employment gap (i.e. the cycle), i is the region identifier, and j indicates the 
industry; for instance, GTAS,AFF  is Tasmania's employment gap in the agriculture 
sector.  For each region, the overall employment gap, Gi,TOT, is derived from the 
sum of trend employment and the sum of actual employment across the nine 
industries. For each industry, the Australasian employment gap, GANZ,j, is derived 
from the sum of actual employment and the sum of trend employment across the 
nine regions.  
 
Aggregate employment gaps for each region other than NT
10 are shown 
in Figure 1. The NZ employment gap is highlighted; the remaining lines represent 
the other eight regions. We present the information in this manner since the 
primary question driving our analysis is whether NZ is an appropriate candidate to 
join a currency union to which the other regions already belong. As regions 
become larger, they tend to become more diversified and so cycles have smaller 
amplitude. The ANZ employment gap has a standard deviation of 1.2%. Apart 
from VIC, all the larger regions' cycles (including NZ) have standard deviations 
of 1.4%-1.5%; TAS and ACT are at 1.7%-1.8%, and NT is at 4.0%. VIC is 
unusual in having a cycle amplitude (1.9%) akin to that of TAS and ACT. 
                                                 
9 We also computed a Baxter-King (BK) band-pass filtered gap (assuming a cycle length of 
between 1.5 and 8 years) and compared it to the HP filtered gap on the overall Australasian series. 
The correlation coefficient between the two cycle measures is 0.990. Given these almost identical 
measures, we restrict ourselves solely to consideration of the HP filtered series. 
10 NT is omitted since the amplitude of its cycle is much larger than for the other regions. For 
clarity, the employment gaps are presented as (Gi,j  -1)*100 rather than Gi,j . 8 
Figure 1: Regional Employment Gaps (%) excl NT: Total Industry* 
*Employment gaps expressed as (Gi,TOT -1)*100 
 
While the NZ cycle's standard deviation is similar to those of NSW, 
QLD, SA and WA, its pattern over 1985-1991 differs from that in any other 
region.
11 This period coincided with the major microeconomic and 
macroeconomic reforms undertaken within New Zealand beginning in 1984 and 
culminating in 1991 (Evans et al, 1996). The reforms initially had a positive 
economic impact as the financial sector was deregulated. However, negative 
balance sheet effects following the October 1987 sharemarket fall, and the effects 
of fiscal tightening and a labour-market "shake-out" after privatization and 
commercialization of government enterprises, led to a sharp fall in employment in 
the late-1980s. After 1991, the NZ employment gap mirrors that of most other 
regions, other than a greater fall following the Asian financial crisis, coinciding 
with a major drought in NZ (Buckle et al, 2003). For these reasons, where our 
                                                 
11 Bjorksten et al (2004) noted strong similarities between the NZ and Australian regional cycles 



























































descriptive statistics apply to NZ, we report results both for the full sample, 
1985(4)-2002(4), and for a shortened sample, 1991(4)-2002(4). 
 
Prior to examining the correlation and transmission of cycles, we 
examine the mean absolute gap and standard deviation of the gap between the 
cycle positions of each region and ANZ. Table 2 presents this information for 
both the full sample period and the 1991(4)-2002(4) sub-sample. Over the full 
sample, these measures indicate a core of five regions (NSW, VIC, QLD, SA, 
WA) with TAS moderately close to the aggregate cycle and NZ further distant. 
ACT and NT are outliers. After 1991, NZ and TAS move to the fringes of the 
core, having similar gaps between their respective cycles and that of ANZ as does 
SA; ACT and NT remain outliers. 
 
Table 2:  Cyclical Differences Between Region & ANZ* 












  1985(4) - 2002(4)  1991(4) - 2002(4) 
ACT  1.5 1.8  1.6  1.9 
NSW  0.5 0.6  0.4  0.6 
NT  3.0 3.9  2.9  3.8 
NZ  1.1 1.4  0.8  0.9 
QLD  0.7 0.8  0.6  0.7 
SA  0.7 0.9  0.7  0.9 
TAS  0.9 1.2  0.8  1.0 
VIC  0.7 0.9  0.5  0.6 
WA  0.7 0.8  0.6  0.8 
*Mean absolute deviation for region i calculated as the mean of  |Gi, TOT - GANZ,TOT|.  
 Standard deviation for each region calculated as standard deviation of (Gi,TOT - GANZ,TOT). 
 
 10 
The cyclical measures indicate that NSW and VIC can be considered the 
core regions of Australasia in cyclical terms, and on most measures so can QLD, 
SA and WA. NZ and TAS are closely related to the core for the post-1991 period. 
ACT and NT cannot be considered as core regions in cyclical terms.  
 
3 Correlation  &  Transmission of Regional & 
Industry Cycles 
In examining the transmission of cycles across regions and across 
industries, we initially follow Kouparitsas's (2002) approach examining 
contemporaneous and lead/lag correlations between regional employment gaps at 
the overall industry level (Gi,TOT). Table 3 presents contemporaneous correlation 
coefficients for the full sample [1985(4)-2002(4)].   
11 
Table 3: Contemporaneous Correlation; 1985(4)-2002(4) 
  Gi,TOT, t  (Region i Employment Gap, Total All Industries, Time t) 
Gi,TOT, t  ACT NSW  NT  NZ  QLD  SA  TAS  VIC  WA  ANZ 
ACT  1.00 0.32 -0.46 0.05 0.20 0.35 0.31 0.15 0.34 0.28 
NSW  0.32 1.00 0.21 0.25 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.77 0.72 0.90 
NT  -0.46 0.21 1.00 0.01 0.40 0.20 0.01 0.31 0.17 0.29 
NZ  0.05 0.25 0.01 1.00 0.09 0.22 0.24 0.32 0.20 0.44 
QLD  0.20 0.69 0.40 0.09 1.00 0.67 0.61 0.74 0.78 0.81 
SA  0.35 0.69 0.20 0.22 0.67 1.00 0.50 0.69 0.66 0.78 
TAS  0.31 0.68 0.01 0.24 0.61 0.50 1.00 0.65 0.47 0.71 
VIC  0.15 0.77 0.31 0.32 0.74 0.69 0.65 1.00 0.74 0.92 
WA  0.34 0.72 0.17 0.20 0.78 0.66 0.47 0.74 1.00 0.82 
ANZ  0.28 0.90 0.29 0.44 0.81 0.78 0.71 0.92 0.82 1.00 
 
Table 4: Lead/Lag Correlation; 1985(4)-2002(4) 
  Gi,TOT, t+1  (Region i Employment Gap, Total All Industries, Time t+1) 
Gi,TOT, t  ACT NSW  NT  NZ  QLD  SA  TAS  VIC  WA  ANZ 
ACT  0.66  0.38 -0.34 0.06 0.27 0.38 0.42 0.20 0.42 0.34 
NSW  0.20 0.83 0.23  0.22 0.62 0.65 0.72  0.74 0.56 0.80 
NT -0.41  0.09 0.59 0.04  0.30 0.18 0.06 0.35 0.10 0.24 
NZ  -0.03  0.26  -0.04 0.92 0.03 0.15 0.21 0.30 0.19 0.41 
QLD  0.17 0.68 0.43 0.18 0.85  0.73 0.62 0.82 0.67  0.82 
SA  0.24 0.69 0.28 0.25 0.60 0.83 0.60  0.69 0.56 0.75 
TAS  0.12 0.54 0.03 0.26 0.40  0.51  0.61 0.56 0.31 0.57 
VIC  0.10 0.73 0.23 0.32 0.59 0.64 0.66  0.90 0.59 0.83 
WA  0.32  0.83 0.23 0.20  0.82 0.71 0.59 0.85 0.87  0.90 
ANZ  0.18 0.84 0.26 0.43 0.69 0.73 0.74  0.90 0.67 0.93 
Bold indicates lead/lag correlation exceeds corresponding contemporaneous correlation 12 
Two features stand out from Table 3. First is the generally "low" 
correlation coefficients compared with Kouparitsas's findings for 8 regions in the 
US. Only 5 of the 36 regional correlations within Australasia exceed 0.70 
(R
2=0.49) and none exceeds 0.78 (R
2=0.61). The median regional correlation in 
the US is 0.77 with a mean of 0.75 (Kouparitsas, 2002). In Australasia, the 
median is 0.33 with a mean of 0.39. The Australasian correlations are, however, 
similar to those in Canada where the median is 0.37 and the mean is 0.33 (Beine 
and Coulombe, 2003). Australasia and Canada each comprise diverse regions that 
may have an agricultural base (e.g. Manitoba, Tasmania) or a minerals base 
(Alberta, Western Australia) or are primarily financial and industrial (Ontario, 
NSW).  
 
Second, each of the Australian states (i.e. each region apart from NZ and 
the two territories) is reasonably highly correlated with ANZ as a whole; TAS is 
lowest at 0.71. The small size and idiosyncratic industrial structures of the two 
territories make their low correlation with ANZ expected. The low correlation of 
NZ with ANZ indicates the possibility of different cyclical forces at work in NZ 
relative to the Australian regions. Table 5, which presents the correlations just for 
1991(4)-2002(4), indicates that the low correlations for NZ are due to 
idiosyncratic outcomes during its reform period through to 1991. Its 
contemporaneous correlation coefficient with each of the Australian regions over 
the post-1991 period ranges from 0.52 to 0.68; its correlation with ANZ is 0.80, 
the same as QLD and WA and above each of SA, TAS and the two territories. In 
the latter part of the sample, NZ was therefore as integrated with the ANZ cycle as 
most Australian regions.  
13 
Table 4 presents the full-sample correlations relating the employment 
gap in period t with that in period t+1. Table 6 provides the same information for 
the shortened period. The figures on the leading diagonal provide a measure of the 
degree of persistence in each region's cycle.
12 More interesting for the inter-
regional transmission of shocks are the magnitudes of each non-diagonal cell. 
Each figure is compared with the corresponding figure in Table 3 (or 5). Where 
the figure exceeds the relevant figure in Table 3 (or 5), the implication is that the 
cycle of the region listed vertically leads the cycle of the region listed 
horizontally. For instance, the full sample contemporaneous correlation of ACT 
and TAS is 0.31 whereas the correlation of ACT in time t with TAS in time t+1 is 
0.42. The implication is that ACT's cycle leads that of TAS. In Table 4 (and 6), 
we note in bold any figure that exceeds its corresponding entry in Table 3 (and 5). 
                                                 
12 The figure is the square root of the R
2 in an equation regressing a region's employment gap on 
its own lag plus a constant (note that it is not the coefficient on the lag). 14 
Table 5: Contemporaneous Correlation; 1991(4)-2002(4) 
  Gi,TOT, t (Region i Employment Gap, Total All Industries, Time t) 
Gi,TOT, t  ACT NSW  NT  NZ  QLD  SA  TAS  VIC  WA  ANZ 
ACT  1.00 0.22 -0.49 0.07 0.23 0.47 0.25 0.07 0.29 0.23 
NSW  0.22 1.00 0.19 0.61 0.71 0.59 0.65 0.78 0.67 0.92 
NT  -0.49 0.19 1.00 0.21 0.22 -0.04  -0.12 0.18 0.02 0.20 
NZ  0.07 0.61 0.21 1.00 0.52 0.66 0.54 0.68 0.55 0.80 
QLD  0.23 0.71 0.22 0.52 1.00 0.51 0.56 0.66 0.76 0.80 
SA  0.47 0.59 -0.04 0.66 0.51 1.00 0.36 0.50 0.56 0.69 
TAS  0.25 0.65 -0.12 0.54 0.56 0.36 1.00 0.71 0.57 0.72 
VIC  0.07 0.78 0.18 0.68 0.66 0.50 0.71 1.00 0.71 0.90 
WA  0.29 0.67 0.02 0.55 0.76 0.56 0.57 0.71 1.00 0.80 
ANZ  0.23 0.92 0.20 0.80 0.80 0.69 0.72 0.90 0.80 1.00 
 
 
Table 6: Lead/Lag Correlation; 1991(4)-2002(4) 
  Gi,TOT, t+1 (Region i Employment Gap, Total All Industries, Time t+1) 
Gi,TOT, t  ACT NSW  NT  NZ  QLD  SA  TAS  VIC  WA  ANZ 
ACT  0.71  0.28 -0.41 0.18 0.18 0.38 0.39 0.19 0.36 0.29 
NSW  0.13 0.80 0.14 0.62  0.55 0.50 0.69  0.78 0.48 0.82 
NT  -0.49 0.07 0.63 0.11 0.22 -0.03 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.13 
NZ  -0.12 0.55 0.22  0.95 0.46 0.55 0.51 0.70  0.48 0.75 
QLD 0.25  0.73  0.30  0.56  0.82 0.51 0.55 0.77  0.71  0.83 
SA  0.41  0.61  -0.05  0.70  0.45 0.81 0.52 0.56 0.56  0.71 
TAS  0.12 0.56 -0.11 0.58 0.37  0.37  0.50 0.70 0.39 0.63 
VIC  -0.06 0.67 0.18 0.66 0.50 0.40 0.60 0.87 0.56 0.78 
WA  0.27  0.80 0.05 0.58 0.75 0.53 0.61 0.82 0.81  0.86 
ANZ  0.09 0.82 0.19 0.80 0.66 0.59 0.71 0.91  0.65 0.93 
Bold indicates lead/lag correlation exceeds corresponding contemporaneous correlation. 
15 
Three regions stand out as leading the cycle of other regions. For each 
sample, ACT, QLD and WA each lead at least 5 of the other 8 regions, and each 
also leads ANZ. For the full period, NT leads the cycle of 4 other regions. A 
common feature shared by WA, QLD and NT is that they are all heavily involved 
in mining compared with other regions. Over the full sample, each of WA and NT 
had an average mining share of 3.7% (WA's share stayed at around this level 
throughout the sample, while NT's dropped sharply from 5.8% to 1.5%); QLD had 
the next largest mining share, averaging 1.4%. In terms of numbers employed in 
mining, each of the three regions averaged between 20,000 and 30,000 mining 
employees over the sample (as did NSW, although this is largely due to its overall 
size; its mining share was lower than the ANZ average). The next largest mining 
region averaged fewer than 6,000 employees. This evidence indicates a prima 
facie case for investigating the importance of mining shocks in determining the 
cycles of these particular regions and thence influencing other regions.  
 
The key distinguishing feature of ACT is that it contains Australia's 
capital city (Canberra) and little else. Its average employment share involved in 
OTS (largely government-related services) was 50% compared with 26% for 
ANZ. The leading nature of ACT relative to other regions may represent a fiscal 
shock that registers first in ACT and then spreads outwards to other regions.  16 
Table 7: Granger Causality Tests (1 lag) H0: Gi,TOT does not Granger-cause Gk,TOT 
  Gk,TOT 
Gi,TOT  ACT NSW  NT  NZ  QLD  SA  TAS  VIC  WA  ANZ 
ACT    *   **    **  **  * 
NSW        ***     * 
N T       *         
NZ         **  **    
QLD    **  ** *   ***  ***  ***  *** 
SA    ** * **     ***      
TAS       **       *** 
VIC    **       ***     
WA    ***      *** *** *** ***    *** 
ANZ    ***      **  ***  ***    
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; all tests over 1985(4)-2002(4) except NZ tests (both directions) are 1991(4)-2002(4) 
 
Table 8: Granger Causality Tests (2 lags) H0: Gi,TOT does not Granger-cause Gk,TOT 
  Gk,TOT 
Gi,TOT  ACT NSW  NT  NZ  QLD  SA  TAS  VIC  WA  ANZ 
ACT        *     **  **   * 
NSW        ***    *   
N T     *           
NZ         *  *    
QLD    *  *      *** *** ***     
SA    * ** * **   ***  **     
TAS     **     ***      * 
VIC         ***    ***   
WA  **  ***      *** *** *** ***    *** 
ANZ    ***      *  ** ***  *** **   
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; all tests over 1985(4)-2002(4) except NZ tests (both directions) are 1991(4)-2002(4) 
17 
We test leads and lags in aggregate cycles more formally with Granger 
causality tests. Each region's aggregate employment gap can be characterized 
either as an AR(1) process [6 regions] or as an AR(2) process [3 regions plus 
ANZ]. We therefore report (in Tables 7 and 8) Granger causality tests using one 
and two lags respectively. All tests are run over the full sample, except in cases 




The aggregate cycles in each of WST and QLD again show out as major 
precursors of cycles in other regions and for ANZ.
14 ACT Granger-causes ANZ in 
each case, consistent with the prior results. Perhaps surprisingly, TAS also 
Granger-causes ANZ in each case, possibly reflecting the influence of a more 
generalized agriculture shock (TAS is second only to NZ in its agriculture share 
throughout the period). The two largest regions, NSW and VIC, have very little in 
the way of lead or lag relationships with other regions. 
 
The regional results lead to some hypotheses regarding the effects of 
sectoral shocks on regional and ANZ cyclical outcomes. In particular, we 
hypothesize that shocks to MIN, OTS and possibly AFF cause regional and ANZ-
wide cycles. We can test whether this is the case using Granger causality tests for 
the impact of Australasian industry cycles on each of the regional cycles. Tables 9 
and 10 present the test results, using one and two lags respectively.
15 
                                                 
13 When the NZ tests are run over the full sample, the only significant test result with one lag is 
QLD causing NZ (at 5%); the only significant result with two lags is VIC causing NZ (at 10%). In 
no case does NZ cause any other region or ANZ. 
14 The exception in the latter case is that QLD does not Granger-cause ANZ with two lags. 
15 The tests for NZ are again run over 1991(4)-2002(4); other samples begin in 1985(4). 18 
Table 9: Granger Causality Tests (1 lag) H0: GANZ,j does not Granger-cause Gk,TOT 
  Gk,TOT 
 
GANZ,j 
ACT NSW  NT  NZ  QLD  SA  TAS  VIC  WA  ANZ 
AFF    *          * 
BFS     *      *  *  
CON  *  ***   **   ***  ***  ***  *** 
EGW      ***        
MAN   ***   *  * **  ***  ***  *** 
MIN            
OTS         **    **  **  *** 
TSC  **        **     
WRT         ***     
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; all tests over 1985(4)-2002(4) except NZ tests are 1991(4)-2002(4) 
 
 
Table 10: Granger Causality Tests (2 lags) H0: GANZ,j does not Granger-cause Gk,TOT 
  Gk,TOT 
 
GANZ,j 
ACT NSW  NT  NZ  QLD  SA  TAS  VIC  WA  ANZ 
AFF    *  **         
BFS          *  **   
CON *  ***      *  ***  ***  ***    *** 
EGW      *        
MAN  ***  ***     * **  **  **    ** 
MIN            
OTS         **          ** 
TSC        **  **   *      
WRT   **        ***  ***       
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; all tests over 1985(4)-2002(4) except NZ tests are 1991(4)-2002(4)  
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Two sectors are shown to Granger-cause most regions. CON and MAN 
each Granger-cause six of the nine regions, plus ANZ, under both lag structures. 
The only other sector to Granger-cause ANZ under both lag structures is OTS 
(possibly reflecting a fiscal shock). MIN does not Granger-cause any region or 
ANZ under either lag structure. We return to this paradoxical result below. 
 
We gain more insight into the role of certain industries in causing 
regional cycles using Granger causality tests between industries. Tables 11 and 12 
present the industry analogues of Tables 7 and 8. Three industries - CON, MAN 
and OTS - are found to Granger-cause the total economy at the 5% level (with 
both 1 and 2 lags). CON and MAN each lead several sectors. OTS is not found to 
lead any specific sector; its effect is discernable in the aggregate only, consistent 
with the effects of a pervasive fiscal shock. The primary industries - AFF and 
MIN - are notable for their lack of influence on other sectors. 20 
Table 11: Granger Causality Tests (1 lag) H0: GANZ,j does not Granger-cause GANZ,k 
  GANZ,k 
GANZ,j  AFF BFS CON  EGW  MAN  MIN OTS TSC  WRT  TOT 
A F F             *  
B F S          *      
CON   ***     **  ***  ***  ***  *** 
E G W            
MAN    ***       **   ***  ***  *** 
MIN    ***  *  *        
OTS            *** 
TSC *  **  *    *  **         
WRT   ***        *    
TOT    ***       **  ***  **    
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; all tests over 1985(4)-2002(4) 
 
Table 12: Granger Causality Tests (2 lags) H0: GANZ,j does not Granger-cause GANZ,k 
  GANZ,k 
GANZ,j  AFF BFS CON  EGW  MAN  MIN OTS TSC  WRT  TOT 
A F F             
BFS       *     **    
CON   ***     **  ***  ***  **  *** 
E G W            
MAN    ***  *    *   ***  **  ** 
M I N             
O T S             * *  
T S C     * *           
WRT *  ***        **    
TOT  *  ***  ***   ** *   ***  **   
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; all tests over 1985(4)-2002(4)   
21 
Overall, the regional and industry results appear to be at odds with one 
another. The regions that are most heavily represented in mining have strong 
causal impacts on other regions, while mining itself has little causal influence 
according to the formal statistics. There are two possible resolutions of this 
paradox. The first is that the link between mining intensity and the leading regions 
is purely coincidental; some other feature associated with those regions may be at 
play. 
 
The second is that mining is a major source of the regional shock but the 
Granger causality tests do not pick up this influence.
16 Mining cycles are driven 
predominantly by two factors: world prices of minerals and new discoveries of 
mineral deposits. Neither of these are likely to be caused in an economic sense (as 
opposed to a temporal, or Granger causality, sense) by other sectoral cycles within 
Australasia. Yet both Tables 11 and 12 show MIN to be Granger-caused by CON 
(at the 1% level in each case) and by MAN (at 5% and 10% with 1 lag and 2 lags 
respectively). An explanation is that a mining expansion must be preceded by 
considerable construction work prior to the mine opening (or expanding). Thus we 
would observe MIN being led in a temporal sense by CON (and possibly also by 
manufacturing via manufacturing sub-sectors that service the mining industry). 
However, in an economic sense, it is the mining shock that causes CON (and 
MAN). If this explanation holds, and if mining shocks are large enough to 
influence the aggregate economy, we would observe CON in mining states 
leading both MIN in those states and leading the aggregate ANZ cycle. We would 
also observe future MIN (in period t+s) "leading" the aggregate cycle (in period t) 
                                                 
16 We have also used the contemporaneous and lead/lag correlation approach to examine the 
influence of industry cycles on other industries and regions, with similar results to the Granger 
causality test results. 22 
reflecting the "s" quarters that it takes to gear up mining employment following 
the shock to the industry.  
 
We examine Granger causality tests (with 2 lags) between CON in each 
region and ANZ total industry cycles; the results are consistent with this 
explanation. Construction in each of WA and QLD lead the ANZ cycle (at the 1% 
level); only one other region (VIC) has its regional construction cycle leading the 
ANZ cycle (also at 1%; no other regions are significant at 10%).  
 
We test for Granger-causality from GANZ,MIN, t+s to GANZ,TOT, t  for each of  
s = -4, …, 0, …, +4, and find a pattern consistent with this explanation. In each 
case (retaining 2 lags in the test) where s = 0, …, -4, the combined coefficient on 
GANZ,MIN   in the Granger-causality test is negative. Where s = +1, … +4, the 
combined coefficient is positive; in three of these cases the coefficients are jointly 
significant at the 5% level and in the other case, at the 10% level (longer lags are 
not significantly different from zero). 
 
While we cannot be conclusive that mining is a significant source of 
shocks in Australasia, the tests are consistent with this hypothesis. Shocks to 
government-related services (OTS) also appear important in generating cycles in 
the aggregate Australasian economy. Manufacturing shocks and shocks to 
construction (to the extent that these shocks are independent of shocks to other 




4  Cyclical Interactions with the Exchange 
Rate 
Since 1991, the New Zealand economic cycle has generally been as 
closely correlated with the cycle in the larger Australian regions as those regions 
are with each other. However the causality tests in Tables 7 and 8 imply that the 
NZ cycle has not been driven particularly strongly by the cycles of the Australian 
regions. No Australian region Granger-causes the NZ cycle at the 5% level when 
two lags are used in the test, and only ACT and SA do so when one lag is used. 
By contrast, six (seven) regions Granger-cause TAS at the 5% level with two lags 
(one lag).  
 
One possible reason for NZ's relative insulation from the cycles of 
Australian regions is that the floating NZDAUD
17 may have acted to buffer NZ 
from the effect of Australian-sourced shocks. Here we test this possibility, again 
through the use of Granger-causality tests. Specifically, we test whether each of 
the regional industry cycles (Gi,j) Granger-causes NZDAUD. In addition, we test 
whether the aggregate cycle in each region (Gi,TOT) Granger-causes NZDAUD, 
whether the Australian industry cycle (GAUS,j) Granger-causes NZDAUD, and 
whether the Australian overall cycle (GAUS,TOT) Granger-causes NZDAUD. We 
use the Australian cycle in these latter cases in place of the ANZ cycle since we 
are dealing with the cross exchange rate between the two countries. 
 
                                                 
17 I.e. the New Zealand - Australia cross rate, measured as the number of Australian dollars per 
NZ dollar. Thus an increase in the NZDAUD signifies an appreciation of the NZD.  
 24 
Thus we have 100 tests (nine regions plus Australia, covering each of 
nine industries plus the overall economy); the potential cycles range from that of 
an almost miniscule industry (e.g. MIN in ACT) to that of the entire Australian 
economy. NZ is one of the regions, so we can test the relative importance of NZ-
sourced shocks and Australian sourced shocks. Since the exchange rate in each 
country has been floating over the entire sample, our preferred sample is the full 
1985(4)-2002(4) period. In addition, since the exchange rate is a forward-looking 
jump variable, we would expect that the test should include at most one lag. 
However, we subject significant test results to robustness checks, covering both 
the shortened sample [1991(4)-2002(4)] and using two lags (over both samples). 
 
Only 8 (6) of the 100 tests are significant at the 10% (5%) level over the 
full sample using one lag. The 8 cycles that impact significantly on NZDAUD are 
(with those significant just at 10% in brackets): GNZ,MAN, GNZ,OTS, GNZ,TOT, 
GAUS,AFF, GNSW,AFF, (GTAS,AFF), (GTAS,TOT), and GSA,MIN.  
 
The first three of these cycles are NZ-sourced, reflecting a major sector 
(MAN),
18 government-sourced shocks (OTS) and the overall economic cycle 
(TOT). The sign of the coefficient on each of these variables in the Granger 
causality test is positive as expected if NZDAUD is acting in an equilibrating 
fashion, appreciating in response to domestic over-heating. 
 
The next three cycles reflect agricultural shocks emanating from 
Australia. The signs on each are negative. Again the direction of this response is 
as expected if the exchange rate is acting in an equilibrating manner. One can 
                                                 
18 MAN employment averaged over 17% of total NZ employment during the sample, and a high 
proportion of its exported output is sent to Australia.  
25 
interpret the reaction here most easily in the circumstances where Australia 
experiences a drought and agricultural employment is consequently below trend. 
The reduction in Australian agricultural exports places downward pressure on the 
AUD, but there is no need for similar depreciation of the NZD since its climatic 
conditions are generally quite independent of those in Australia.
19 Thus the 
NZDAUD appreciates in these circumstances, as indicated by the coefficient in 
the test. The (weak) GTAS,TOT effect most probably reflects the same agricultural 
effect given the importance of AFF in the Tasmanian economy. This effect is no 
longer significant at the 10% level when two lags are used in the test, whereas the 
other seven tests remain significant with the use of two lags.  
 
The GSA,MIN effect may indicate that mining shocks have had some 
impact on NZDAUD. However, this effect seems like a "rogue" test result. South 
Australia's mining employment has averaged only 0.7% of its total employment, 
and has averaged just 0.06% of overall Australian employment over the sample. 
Further, the coefficient on GSA,MIN in the test is positive. If taken at face value, this 
result would suggest that the AUD depreciates relative to the NZD when there is a 
positive shock to MIN in Australia.
20 Over the shorter sample, the significance 
level of this variable drops to 9.7% with one lag, and to 24% with two lags. We 
therefore discount the relevance of this result. 
 
Over the shortened sample, the three Australian AFF cycles (for NSW, 
TAS and AUS) no longer Granger-cause NZDAUD at the 10% level (using each 
of one and two lags in the test). This suggests that the Australian AFF effects may 
                                                 
19 The two countries are separated by a 2,000 kilometre stretch of ocean. 
20 The correlation coefficient between GSA,MIN and GAUS,MIN is positive (0.21). 26 
not be robust.
21 The New Zealand OTS effect also is no longer significant over the 
shortened sample. This may reflect the impact of New Zealand's Fiscal 
Responsibility Act, 1991 that sought to reduce shocks to fiscal policy. We treat 
each of the Australian AFF and New Zealand OTS effects with caution as a result 
of their lack of robustness. 
 
The two results that are robust across sample periods and across the use 
of each of one and two lags in the test are the impacts of GNZ,MAN and GNZ,TOT on 
NZDAUD. Each cycle retains a significant positive impact on NZDAUD in each 
of the four variants of the test. Thus the data indicate that, of all regional industry 
effects, the NZDAUD is affected principally by the overall NZ cycle, with the 
manufacturing component of that cycle being the most important contributor. The 
influence of the overall NZ cycle on NZDAUD can be seen clearly in Figure 2 
which plots each of GNZ,TOT and NZDAUD (suitably scaled). The 
contemporaneous correlation between GNZ,TOT,t and NZDAUDt is 0.69. The 
correlation of GNZ,TOT,t with the next period's cross rate (NZDAUDt+1) is 0.72. The 
greater correlation of GNZ,TOT,t with NZDAUDt+1 than with NZDAUDt is 
consistent with Kouparitsas's approach to finding causality. Further, while GNZ,TOT 
Granger-causes NZDAUD (at the 1% level), NZDAUD does not Granger-cause 
GNZ,TOT at even the 20% level. Thus the causality is in one direction only. 
 
                                                 
21 Alternatively, it may be that their key effect was early in the sample. However, the variation in 
each of GAUS,AFF and GNSW,AFF was greater in the latter part of the sample than the earlier part of the 
sample, so if their effect on NZDAUD was robust, they should have maintained their significance 
over the shorter sample.  
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Figure 2: NZ Employment Gap and NZDAUD* 
NZ employment gap expressed as (GNZ,TOT -1)*100 
NZDAUD expressed as (NZDAUD-NZDAUD)*20, where NZDAUD is NZDAUD sample mean; 
series multiplied by 20 for scaling purposes 
 
5 Conclusions 
Within Australasia, four regions are prominent in leading the cycles of 
other regions. ACT leads the ANZ cycle and leads the cycle of a number of 
regions. The finding that the OTS industry also leads the ANZ cycle, coupled with 
the strong representation of OTS (largely government services) within ACT 
(containing Australia's capital city) points clearly to the importance of Australian 
fiscal shocks in leading the Australasian cycle. The three major mining regions, 
Western Australia, Queensland and Northern Territory, each also lead the ANZ 
cycle and the cycles in a number of individual regions. Here, however, the 
evidence that it is mining shocks that are at work is less clear-cut; MIN cycles do 
not lead other industries and nor do they lead the cycles in other regions. Some 








































NZ Total Employment Gap (%)    NZDAUD (Deviation from mean/5) (%)28 
economic role in causing the cycles in other regions even though the measured 
MIN cycles occur after the onset of cycles in other industries and regions. 
 
Since 1991, the NZ cycle has been as highly correlated with the ANZ 
cycle and with the cycle of other large regions, as have the cycles of most of those 
regions themselves. This was not the case between 1985 and 1991, when New 
Zealand's economic reform process gave the country quite idiosyncratic cycles 
relative to those elsewhere in Australasia. Despite the high post-1991 correlation, 
there is not strong evidence that the NZ cycle has been "caused" by the cycles in 
other Australasian regions or industries. One potential explanation for this latter 
result is that cycles in NZ and in the Australian states since 1991 have each been 
influenced principally by factors external to Australasia, particularly by trading 
partner experiences. In this case, cycles could be highly correlated without inter-
regional transmission of cycles within ANZ. 
 
Another potential explanation of this finding is that the NZDAUD (the 
New Zealand - Australia cross exchange rate) has played a buffering role in 
response to Australian sourced shocks that has insulated the NZ cycle from 
Australian shocks. Our disaggregation of the available regional data into regional 
industry cycles is particularly useful in testing this hypothesis. We have analyzed 
which regional industry cycles have had a causal influence on (the floating) 
NZDAUD since 1985(4). By far the strongest regional industry impacts on the 
NZDAUD stem from the overall NZ cycle, and from the NZ manufacturing cycle. 
These effects are robust over different sample periods and different specifications 
of the Granger causality test. In addition, there is some weak evidence that NZ 
fiscal shocks have impacted on the NZDAUD, particularly earlier in the sample.  
29 
There is some weak evidence also that Australian agriculture shocks 
(particularly in NSW and, to a lesser extent, in Tasmania) have had some impact 
on the NZDAUD, again mainly earlier in the sample period. There is no evidence 
of other Australian industries or regions impacting on the cross rate. In particular, 
Australian mining booms do not appear to have had any material impact on the 
NZDAUD.  
 
An often voiced concern in New Zealand regarding potential common 
currency with Australia is that New Zealand would lose the ability to adjust to 
Australian mineral booms through exchange rate adjustment. While in theory this 
is correct, the evidence over the floating rate period suggests that the NZDAUD 
has not played this role in practice, even though the NZD has been floating 
independently of the AUD. Thus loss of monetary sovereignty in this respect may 
not be of major consequence. Further, the lack of NZDAUD adjustment to 
Australian AFF shocks in the post-1991 period suggests that again there may not 
be a material loss of flexibility in response to an Australian drought or other 
Australian-sourced agriculture shock. 
 
The evidence instead suggests that a more important loss of monetary 
sovereignty may arise through the loss of exchange rate flexibility consequent on 
a New Zealand-specific shock, especially one that hits the manufacturing sector.
22 
It is these types of shocks that the NZDAUD has been most responsive to since it 
was floated in 1985. The exchange rate response has generally been in an 
equilibrating direction for the economy, with an NZDAUD appreciation as the 
                                                 
22 Examples might include domestic fiscal shocks, climatic shocks and terms of trade shocks 
affecting products for which NZ has a much stronger exposure than does Australia. (NZ 
manufacturing has a high food processing content so climatic and terms of trade shocks can 
impinge materially on the MAN cycle.) 30 
economy overheats. If these cycles could be dampened, this role for NZD 
flexibility would be diminished. If, however, these cycles cannot be materially 
dampened, then the establishment of a common currency could create a 
macroeconomic cost for New Zealand. Whether this cost is outweighed by the 
microeconomic benefits cannot be ascertained from the current analysis. 
Nevertheless the results indicate that formation of a common currency is not a 
"win-win" situation. Instead, a trade-off between macroeconomic and 
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